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<a>1. INTRODUCTION 
As Max Huber, in the famous Island of Palmas case, captured perfectly, the nature of the 
enduring relationship between a polity organized as a State and its territory, including the 
resources located therein, is one of exclusive jurisdiction.1 This vision of sovereignty grants 
the State exclusive powers over the territory both as an object and as a spatial entity. An 
independent polity organized as a State hence both ‘owns’ the territory (dominium) and 
‘controls’ the space (imperium).2 Territorial control and ownership, including over resources, 
are thus an intimate expression of a State’s independence as it is an essential attribute of 
sovereignty.  
It is thus little surprise that soon after decolonization, newly independent States affirmed 
their permanent sovereignty over natural resources (permanent sovereignty) as a means to 
claim back what they ‘owned’ (ie natural resources located within their territory) from the 
foreign corporations that were exploiting them.3 Control over resources thus ensured that 
independence was not just an empty shell but a concrete attribute which would pave the way 
to economic development. Permanent sovereignty became an instrument for the 
transformation of existing international economic relations towards the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the recognition of a right to development 
centered on national sovereignty, fairness and wealth redistribution from the North to the 
South.4 In this sense, permanent sovereignty protects the freedom of the State to choose its 
own path, regarding the exploration, exploitation and conservation of its natural resources. 
                                                 
1 See Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v USA) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, at 838. 
2 Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Yann Kerbrat, Droit International Public (12th ed., Dalloz, 2014) at 88. 
3 See Franz Xaver Perrez, ‘The Relationship between “Permanent Sovereignty” and the Obligation Not to Cause 
Transboundary Environmental Damage’ (1996) 26 Environmental Law 1187, at 1190. 
4 Eg ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’, UNGA Res 3201 (1 May 
1974), preamble. 
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This state of affairs, however, masks an inherent tension between the organization of the 
international society of States on the basis of territorial sovereignty and the interconnected 
and interdependent nature of the resources of the biosphere, which do not respect artificial 
territorial delimitations.5 In addition, most environmental problems, including resource 
depletion, today not only transcend national boundaries, they take on a global character. 
Indeed, the management of tropical forests, for example, whose exploitation and conservation 
typically falls under the national sovereignty of the State where they are located, directly 
affects biodiversity and the climate system – environmental challenges with characteristically 
worldwide consequences.6  
With the growing realization of these ecological interdependencies, the international 
community of States, alongside and almost concomitantly with the development of the NIEO 
and its armored conception of sovereignty, started developing principles and standards of 
environmental protection, including for the conservation of natural resources and the 
protection of wildlife.  Beyond early examples of nature conservation regimes at sectoral or 
regional levels, the diffusion of general principles of resource protection took on a global 
dimension in the 1970s and particularly with the <1972?> Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment. The Stockholm Declaration calls for safeguarding the natural resources 
of the Earth for present and future generations7 and highlights man’s special responsibility to 
safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat.8 The international 
community’s newly emerged concern for the conservation of the resources of the Earth as 
humanity’s home, beyond any national territorial delimitation, is also saliently echoed in the 
principles of the World Charter for Nature of 1982, which requests that all areas of the Earth 
be subject to principles of conservation.9  
A conflict thus emerged between the principle of national sovereignty over natural 
resources and the idea that each State is master in its own house, on the one hand, and the 
evolving general principles of resource protection aiming to constrain State behavior 
                                                 
5 Michael Bowman, ‘Environmental Protection and the Concept of Common Concern of Mankind’ in Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice et al. (eds), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2010) 494. See also Chapter 8 in this volume. 
6 See Chapter 8 in this volume. 
7 ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’ (1972) UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (Stockholm Declaration), Principle 2. 
8 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 4. See also Principles 3 and 5. See Chapter 10 in this volume. 
9 UNGA Res 37/7 (28 October 1982), Principle 3. See also Principles 1 and 2. 
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regarding natural resources located within their territory, on the other hand. This is a conflict 
between national sovereignty and survival in an interdependent world.10 Whether this conflict 
can be resolved, and how, poses important questions for the traditional understanding of the 
notion of sovereignty: have developments in the environmental field led to a renewed 
conception of sovereignty? 
This chapter sheds light on these issues, firstly by exploring briefly how the 
reorganization of emerging and consolidating international rules and principles of 
environmental protection around the ‘matrix’ of sustainable development may allow moving 
beyond a purely conflictual relationship between national sovereignty and resource 
preservation towards one based on mutual interest.11 It then reflects on how growing 
environmental interdependencies and the corresponding rise of new or redefined legal 
concepts and categories such as common concern, common property, or shared resources, 
challenge traditional conceptions of sovereignty. Finally, the chapter offers a partial mapping 
of the widening environmental constraints on national sovereignty over natural resources, 
ranging from classic situations of transboundary damage; to scenarios where sovereignty 
constraints flow from a mere international interest in resource protection; through to 
sovereignty limitations even in the absence of any immediate international interest in 
resource protection. 
 
<A>2. FROM ARCADIA TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: RESOURCE 
‘CONSERVATION’ IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY? 
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and the freedom endowed to 
the States to exploit such resources located on their territory as they see fit, may seem 
irreconcilable with a general duty of nature preservation which restricts the State’s right to 
exploit national resources. The evolution of both environmental law and the law of 
development at the turn of the twenty-first century, however, has opened the door to a 
renewed relationship between national sovereignty and resource protection.  
Grassroots and deep ecology movements, which significantly contributed to bringing 
environmental awareness to the fore of the international agenda in the 1960s, were quite 
                                                 
10 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) at 12. 
11 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Où en est le Droit International de l’Environnement à la Fin du Siècle?’ (1997) 101 
Revue Générale de Droit International Public 873, at 886. 
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notably inspired by ‘Arcadian’ conceptions of ecology.12 Arcadian ecologists are wary of the 
destructive power of industrialization and advocate a return to a more harmonious 
relationship with nature.13 At the core of Arcadian ecology is nature preservation for its own 
sake and its own value. Preservationists thus favor an eco-centric form of environmentalism. 
In contrast, conservationists adopt a much more anthropocentric approach to environmental 
protection.14 If nature is to be protected, it is for the benefit of humans. In that sense, 
conservationists favor a clearly utilitarian vision of ecology, arguing for the wise use of 
nature to allow for economic development. In other words, conservationists advocate a 
sustainable approach to natural resources use.15  
However, the international environmental movement never embraced a fully 
preservationist approach to nature protection. It is instead rooted in conservationist and 
managerial approaches to environmental stewardship, placing humans’ well-being at the 
center of nature protection concerns. With the growing consciousness of environmental 
interdependencies and the need to provide global answers to tackle global problems such as 
ozone depletion, global warming, or the loss of biodiversity, this anthropocentric approach to 
nature protection was further deepened in a pledge from the industrialized North to get the 
developing South on board. The link between environmental protection and economic 
development, already apparent in Stockholm in 1972, culminated in the consecration of the 
concept of sustainable development at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
in 1992.16 This paradigmatic principle aims to cater both for the needs of the present (and 
hence allow the South to pursue economic development) as well as of future generations.17 
From that perspective, the environment must be protected and natural resources conserved in 
a way that will allow future generations to meet their own environmental and developmental 
                                                 
12 Robert Falkner, ‘The Rise of Global Environmental Responsibility in World Politics’ in Antje Vetterlein and 
Hannes Hansen-Magnusson (eds), Responsibility in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. On the distinction between preservation and conservation, see also Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Biological 
Resources’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 363, at 371. 
16 It is a prominent feature of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also 
known as the Earth Summit, and of its ‘Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development’ (1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26. 
17 See the definition in Gro Brundtland et al., Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987) at 51. 
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needs. Development that is sustainable is thus development that uses environmental 
protection as a means to ensure long-term economic and social (ie human) development.  
Arguably, since the 1992 Rio Conference, modern international environmental law has 
been reorganized around sustainable development and traditional principles of environmental 
protection have thus been reinterpreted in this new light. Conceptions of nature conservation 
have now been largely overtaken by the principle of sustainable use of natural resources, the 
emphasis being on the capacity to use and exploit natural resources, so long as it is at a rate 
that does not lead to their long-term decline.18 By incorporating development needs into the 
nature preservation agenda, this shift of emphasis undeniably works some way towards 
accommodating national sovereignty and resource protection principles. The sustainable 
utilization of resources indeed promotes long-term and healthy economic development, the 
very object that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources aims to pursue. 
At the same time that the environmental movement integrated economic concerns into its 
agenda, the South’s perception of permanent sovereignty was facing the challenge of an 
evolving concept of development. The South’s demands for the establishment of a NIEO and 
the recognition of a right to development faced strong northern opposition and ultimately 
failed to transform international economic relations along these lines.19 Instead, the 
North<en>South dialogue refocused around the concept of sustainable development as the 
new overarching definition of economic development reflecting an acceptable compromise. 
This, in turn, paved the way for a renewed conception of permanent sovereignty in line with 
the objectives of sustainable development. Indeed, the radical conception of permanent 
sovereignty adopted by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the 
Declaration for a NIEO, never quite took hold. It is instead the earlier General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 of 1962 that gathered consensus. Accordingly, the ‘right of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in 
the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State 
                                                 
18 See Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 
UNTS 382, Article 2. 
19 See Francesco Francioni, ‘Equity in International Law’ in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) para 24. 
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concerned’.20 Crucially, the resolution acknowledges a strong link between economic 
development and the well-being of the people.  
However, it is also now generally accepted that people’s well-being is dependent on the 
quality of the environment in which they live. In fact, the international community accepts 
that people’s well-being will only be ensured if the State adopts a path of sustainable 
development which integrates environmental concerns and protects natural resources from 
depletion to ensure their sustainable use. From this standpoint, the evolution of the 
conception of development from economic growth to sustainable development may well 
mean that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources today includes a duty 
of environmental protection,21 as only then can permanent sovereignty be exercised in the 
interest of development and of the well-being of the people of the State as specified in 
Resolution 1803. Resource protection, or at least sustainable use, would thus be an integral 
element of the exercise of national sovereignty. Accordingly, permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources and resource protection may have found a mutual interest in aiming to 
achieve sustainable development. 
This, however, does not exclude underlying tensions and conflicts. Indeed, even if, at the 
broad theoretical level, the principles of national sovereignty and nature protection can be 
reconciled, in practical terms, the law of natural resources remains in a process of evolution. 
Emerging rules and notions, with sometimes sovereignty-accommodating overtones, 
sometimes more overtly conflictual ones, are, in this process, constantly in tension, pulling 
the law in various directions in search of a renewed conception of national sovereignty. The 
development of new or redefined concepts and legal categories better fitted to today’s 
international reality of environmental interdependencies thus challenges the traditional 
understanding of national sovereignty. 
 
<A>3. INTERDEPENDENCIES AND CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY 
                                                 
20 Ibid., para 1. Some arbitral decisions have seen in this a principle of customary international law: eg, Texaco 
Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v Government of Libya (1977) 53 
International Law Reports 389. 
21 On the meaning and implications of sustainable development, see Virginie Barral, ‘Sustainable Development 
in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive Legal Norm’ (2012) 23 European Journal of 
International Law 377; and Virginie Barral, Le Développement Durable en Droit International: Incidences 
Juridiques d’une Norme Évolutive (Bruylant, 2015). On whether permanent sovereignty includes duties for 
States, see Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) especially Chapter 9 and at 391–392. 
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If most of the Earth is divided into portions of territories allocated to States purporting to 
exercise their sovereignty there, classic international law has long recognized limits to this 
configuration. Indeed, there are still portions of the Earth that have not been appropriated, 
that are hence beyond national jurisdiction, and whose regimes have instead been devised by 
international law. Two such regimes inherently challenge the traditional notion of 
sovereignty. Common spaces, including the high seas, may be exploited by States 
individually but cannot be appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty of any one State.22 Other 
areas, however, such as the deep seabed23 and outer space, have been further 
internationalized, and individual States may not exploit their resources for their own benefit 
as these are seen as the common heritage of mankind. In both contexts, the limits placed on 
sovereignty arise out of the common interest of States in a resource beyond domestic 
jurisdiction. But States may also have a common interest in resources located within the 
confines of domestic jurisdiction. This is the case where a resource is shared between two or 
more States, or where mankind shares a common concern in the impact and exercise of 
national sovereignty over resources such as biodiversity or the atmosphere. This section will 
first explore the relationship between the notions of sovereignty and those of common 
property and common heritage of mankind. It will then investigate the extent to which the 
legal characterization of shared resources and of common concern of mankind challenges the 
exercise of State sovereignty or leads to a renewed conception of it. 
<b>3.1. Sovereignty and Internationalized Regimes: Common Property and Common 
Heritage 
Common spaces beyond national jurisdiction, most notably the high seas, are governed by a 
regime of common property.24 According to this regime, common spaces are insusceptible of 
appropriation, although the (biological) resources they contain may be appropriated by 
individual States. In other words, even though States may exploit the natural resources 
located in the common spaces, they cannot exercise their exclusive jurisdiction therein. 
Common property thus reflects the common interest of all States in the exploitation of these 
resources, thereby justifying a regime of open access. Such open access is, however, now 
                                                 
22 See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009) at 195; and Chapter 18 in this volume. 
23 See Chapter 19 in this volume. 
24 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 22), at 194. Other areas include outer space and arguably Antarctica. On the 
latter, see Chapter 21 in this volume. 
9 
 
being increasingly regulated by a number of international, regional or bilateral fisheries or 
resource protection conventions.25 A common interest in exploitation indeed necessarily leads 
to a common interest in conservation of resources for the benefit of all, as recognized by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case.26 If left unregulated, 
the resources of the high seas would soon become depleted to the detriment of all.27 In other 
words, States have come to realize that the long-term exploitation of the seas’ living 
resources will only be ensured through their sustainable use. Ultimately, the common 
property regime thus places a dual limit on State sovereignty: it subtracts the common space 
from the exclusive jurisdiction of the State and it subjects resources to exploitation 
restrictions.  
The common heritage of mankind regime takes a step further in limiting sovereignty as it 
not only internationalizes the space, but also the ownership of resources. In other words, not 
only is the space not susceptible of territorial appropriation, but neither are the resources. 
Their exploitation must instead be carried out in the interest of mankind. Admittedly, the 
effective operation of this radically innovative legal concept has so far been confined to very 
limited categories of resources: the non-living resources of the deep seabed and, to a lesser 
extent, those of the Moon.28 The regime of the deep seabed undoubtedly currently represents 
the most advanced form of internationalization as exploitation of the resources of this area 
and equitable sharing of the benefits are under the control of the International Seabed 
Authority, itself acting for the benefit of mankind whose interests it represents.  
Beyond debates over the practical effectiveness of this original legal category, at the 
theoretical level, it most certainly challenges the traditional structure of the international 
society composed of sovereign States. Indeed, exploitation and management of common 
heritage resources are not in the interest of the international society of States, nor even of the 
international community. Rather, they are for the benefit of mankind. The concept of 
common heritage thus goes beyond statehood and transcends the State as the central subject 
of international law to envisage mankind as a legal entity. Mankind is, for its part, trans-
                                                 
25 See Chapter 9 in this volume. 
26 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Reports 3, para 72. 
27 As famously expressed by Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
28 See, respectively, UNCLOS Article 136 and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 5 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3, Article 4. 
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temporal in that it encompasses, past, present and, crucially, future generations.29 The 
exploitation of resources belonging to the common heritage of mankind may thus be seen as 
the management of resources held in trust for future generations.30 The personification of 
mankind and the idea of trusteeship that accompanies it make appealing legal concepts for 
international environmental law,31 a discipline in search of innovative legal solutions to 
address challenging problems that cannot otherwise be solved solely through classic legal 
mechanisms. If the deep seabed regime has thus far not been replicated,32 there is a growing 
tendency to see in the natural environment and its component parts an international public 
good being held in trust for future generations.33 Should the concept of humanity or trust 
regimes be developed further in the environmental field, natural resources located under 
domestic jurisdiction could well end up being immunized from the classic operation of the 
principle of national sovereignty. 
<b>3.2. Sovereignty and Shared Resources 
Natural resources such as migratory birds or fish, wild animals, river and lake ecosystems, 
forests or mountain ranges do not neatly fit within artificial territorial boundaries and often 
straddle over two or more sovereign States, raising issues of control powers allocation. 
Adjustments to national sovereignty are, in such circumstances, in order, and international 
law offers examples if not of shared sovereignty proper, at least of joint management 
regimes. The 1970s saw an attempt at the development of a regime of shared natural 
resources under the auspices of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which received a 
                                                 
29 Dupuy and Kerbrat (n 2), at 852. 
30 See generally Edith Brown-Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common 
Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity (Innovation in International Law) (Transnational Publishing, 1989); see 
also Peter Sand, ‘Principle 27: Cooperation in a Spirit of Global Partnership’ in Jorge Viñuales (ed.), The Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development. A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015) 617, at 623–
629. 
31 Dupuy and Kerbrat (n 2), at 859. 
32 For a discussion of common heritage in relation to marine genetic resources in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, see Chapter 20 in this volume. 
33 Such an approach can be seen in the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(adopted 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975) 1977 UNTS 151 (WHC); the 2003 African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (revised) (adopted 1 July 2003), Article 4; the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (adopted 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 
1975) 993 UNTS 243 (CITES), preamble; the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of 
Wild Animals (adopted 23 June 1979, entered into force 1 November 1983) 1651 UNTS 356 (Bonn 
Convention), preamble; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, 
entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC), Article 3.1; and the Convention on the 
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (adopted 2 November 2001, entered into force 2 January 2009) 2562 
UNTS 3. 
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lukewarm response from States due to controversies notably surrounding the use and 
meaning of the term ‘shared resources’.34 These led to the discontinuance of related topics at 
the International Law Commission (ILC) and the removal of references to such terminology 
in the codification of the law of international watercourses.35  
The rules contained in UNEP’s document, however, were far from displacing the notion 
of sovereignty altogether and referred to duties of transboundary cooperation, equitable 
utilization, diligence, information and consultation when a State plans to use the shared 
resource in a way that might affect the other riparian States. Crucially, despite controversies 
surrounding UNEP’s guidelines, all these principles are now increasingly recognized as 
reflecting customary international law.  In fact, the particular situation of shared or 
transboundary resources has been judicially acknowledged as far back as 1929 when the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, in the River Oder case, referred to the ‘community 
of interest’ among an international river’s riparian States.36 Equitable and reasonable use of 
shared resources is now accepted as a central customary principle of the law of international 
watercourses. It finds judicial reflection in the decision of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case where the court sees in it a ‘basic right’.37 
Equitable and reasonable use also features, along with the cooperation, diligence, notification 
and consultation duties mentioned, among an increasing range of conventional joint 
management regimes of shared resources, including international rivers and lakes, wetlands, 
mountain chains or cultural heritage sites.38 Such principles also find reflection in the ILC 
2008 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers.39 More recently, in the Pulp Mills 
case, the ICJ has considered that ‘the procedural obligations of informing, notifying and 
negotiating […] are all the more vital when a shared resource is at issue, as in the case of the 
River Uruguay, which can only be protected through close and continuous co-operation 
                                                 
34 Some States had expressed a preference for the terminology of transboundary resources. 
35 The topic of Shared Natural Resources (Oil and Gas) in particular was discontinued at the ILC and for a 
removal of references to the concept see UNEP Principles on Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of 
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States (1978) 17 International Legal Materials 1094, UN Doc 
IG/12/2, para 15. On watercourses, see Chapter 15 in this volume. 
36 Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (1929) PCIJ 
Reports Series A No 23, at 27. 
37 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Reports 7, 
para 78. 
38 Eg Bowman (n 5), at 498–500. 
39 (2008) UN GAOR, 63rd Session Supp No 10, UN Doc A/63/10. 
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between the riparian States’.40 Crucially the ICJ also imparts a ‘greener’ meaning to the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, that should allow for sustainable 
development which takes account of both the conservation of the river environment and its 
economic development.41  
Sustainable development thus appears to have successfully colored the interpretation of 
the principle of equitable and reasonable use, which now incorporates environmental 
protection concerns.42 The gap between equitable utilization and sustainable use thus seems 
to be narrowing in favor of the latter, since utilization of a shared resource will only be 
equitable and reasonable, it seems, if it is sustainable. These mainly procedural obligations 
are admittedly a long way from displacing the central principle of national sovereignty, yet 
they do formulate sovereignty constraints – or at least require adjustments to the traditional 
understanding of sovereignty, as international law today seems to acknowledge that resource 
protection considerations must be fully integrated within resource use plans. 
<b>3.3. Sovereignty and Common Environmental Concerns 
Yet another innovative legal category requiring adjustments to sovereignty has emerged in 
response to growing environmental interdependence: the common concern of mankind. Its 
emergence is the result of a double phenomenon. It was prompted, on the one hand, by the 
increasingly suspicious attitude of the international community, or at least part of it, vis-à-vis 
the notion of common heritage, which presupposes significant transfers and redistribution of 
sovereignty in favor of humanity. However, it was also facilitated by a renewed international 
context: the paradigm shift towards sustainable development. The 1992 Rio Conference, by 
setting this new objective for the international community, acknowledged the latter’s global 
environmental responsibility. The Earth Summit acknowledged both the existence of global 
environmental concerns and the global demand for such concerns to be adequately addressed. 
The atmosphere came to be seen as a global unity irrespective of territorial boundaries and its 
climate-change-induced deterioration a common concern of mankind.43 Equally, despite their 
location within the confines of domestic jurisdictions, the international community’s 
realization that the benefits of biological resources accrue to humanity as a whole led to the 
                                                 
40 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Reports 14, 
para 81. 
41 Pulp Mills, para 75. 
42 Pulp Mills, para 177. See further Barral (2012) (n 21), at 397. 
43 UNFCCC, preamble recital 1. 
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recognition of biodiversity’s conservation as a common concern to humankind. And so a new 
concept challenging sovereignty was born. 
The fact that it is climate change and the conservation of biodiversity that are recognized 
as common concerns, rather than the atmosphere or biodiversity per se, has particular 
implications: it is not a spatial entity or a resource that is the subject of common concern but 
rather environmental processes and the responses they require. Hence, unlike for common 
heritage resources or those of the global commons, common concern does not seek to 
establish common ownership or management.44 In that sense, it preserves States’ territorial 
sovereignty. State sovereignty is not, however, left completely intact. Recognition of an issue 
as a common concern of mankind indeed limits the State’s freedom of action as it ‘does not 
fall solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States, owing to its global importance and 
consequences for all’.45 Thus the State’s freedom of action may well be limited concerning 
resources wholly located within their territory, even in the absence of transboundary damage 
to another State’s rights, so long as their conservation is of concern to all. Significantly, the 
reference to mankind rather than the international community of States furthers the 
conceptual shift already started by the notion of common heritage. For Stec, it ‘implies values 
that are above and beyond the calculated interests of states’ and ‘its long-term view, bridging 
generations also implicitly runs longer than the actual term of sovereignty of a typical form of 
government. Thus, “common concern” marks a transition from a community of self-
interested and autonomous states with absolute territorial sovereignty to a mixed global 
community with restraints on sovereignty’.46  
At a more practical level, the concept of common concern has two direct legal 
consequences. Firstly, if an issue is recognized as of common concern, then any legal 
obligation aimed at addressing this issue will be an obligation owed erga omnes,47 since all 
                                                 
44 ILC, Second Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, Special Rapporteur Murase (2015) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/681, at 22. 
45 Ibid., at 23. See also Stephen Stec, ‘Humanitarian Limits to Sovereignty: Common Concern and Common 
Heritage Approaches to Natural Resources and the Environment’ (2010) 12 International Community Law 
Review 361, at 384. 
46 Ibid, at 368. 
47 Or, erga omnes partes, if the recognition of common concern is based on a treaty that does not have universal 
membership. 
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States will have an interest in its respect.48 Secondly, it will legitimize and even require 
States’ cooperation, perhaps as of necessity, to address the concern since what is at the heart 
of the notion is the collective responsibility to act.49 It thus implies a legal duty of 
cooperation and of collective action. Put slightly differently, the protection of resources of 
global significance is in the general interest of mankind, which places a responsibility on 
States to cooperate for their sustainable development.50 Yet, as the concept of common 
concern leaves the ‘ownership’ of resources untouched, and not transferred either to the 
international community or to humanity, it is through the prism of States’ sovereign actions 
in the general interest that their protection and sustainable development may be effected. For 
Francioni, the concept of common concern is nevertheless transformative of the normative 
perspective on sovereignty since,  
<quotation> 
it is no longer seen as absolute power and control over the physical space subject to 
national jurisdiction but is analyzed through the lens of its functional relationship to 
the general interest of the world community to respect and protect environmental 
values.51  
</quotation> 
 
From this perspective not only do environmental measures gain in legitimacy as they are 
the outcome of ‘democratic-majoritarian decision-making of the people with regard to the use 
                                                 
48 See Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage and Common Concern’ in Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (n 15) 551, at 566; Dinah Shelton, ‘Common Concern of Humanity’ (2009) 1 
Iustum Aequum Salutare 33, at 39. Though this has its own limitations in view of both the ill-suited nature of 
State responsibility in the environmental field and international law’s difficulties in recognizing the possibility 
of an actio popularis, see ILC, Second Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere (n 44), at 24 and Brunnée (n 
49), at 566. 
49 See ILC, Second Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere (n 44), at 23, citing Duncan French ‘Common 
Concern, Common Heritage and Other Global(-ising) Concepts: Rhetorical Devices, Legal Principles or a 
Fundamental Challenge?’ in Michael Bowman et al. (eds), Research Handbook on Biodiversity and Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2016). 
50 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 22), at 130. French, in addition, argues that common concern endows the 
international community with a legal interest in the domestic affairs of an individual State and in particular in 
those domestic issues that prevent a State from achieving sustainable development. See Duncan French, ‘A 
Reappraisal of Sovereignty in the Light of Global Environmental Concerns’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 376, at 
393. 
51 Francesco Francioni, ‘The Private Sector and the Challenge of Implementation’, in Pierre-Marie Dupuy and 
Jorge Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investments to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives and 
Safeguards (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 30. 
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of natural resources’52 but ‘the implementation of international environmental law becomes 
part of a reasonable exercise of sovereignty for the attainment of a common good’.53 
Obviously such a perception of sovereignty functional to the general interest in 
environmental protection and resource conservation presupposes a conscientious State that 
respects democratic processes, or a sufficiently well-informed democratic base. Even in this 
scenario, the necessity of inter-temporality remains at odds with the notion of the sovereign 
State, whose life may be quite short and that of its government even shorter.54 Eventually, 
despite its formal preservation of national sovereignty the trans-temporal dimension of the 
concept of common concern, through its designation of mankind as the entity ‘concerned’, 
may well in time transcend State sovereignty.55  
Admittedly, the sovereign State is not on its last breath yet, and in the meantime, it can be 
safely concluded that even if the emergence or reorientation of the legal concepts and 
categories explored are not wholly displacing national sovereignty, they are at least adjusting 
its meaning and perception. A core thread running through notions of common property, 
common heritage, shared resources, or common concern is no doubt that of the commonality 
of interest in the resources which such notions aim to regulate and in their conservation with 
a view to their sustainable use, sometimes even in the interest of future generations. As such, 
commonality of interest and trans-temporality, in and of themselves challenge national 
sovereignty by subtracting the resources concerned from the State’s domaine réservé. Beyond 
such vast and innovative conceptual categories, sovereignty is further constrained by an 
increasing range of specific environmental legal standards. 
 
<A>4. THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AND SOVEREIGNTY 
CONSTRAINTS 
If the current structure of the international legal system is premised upon the fundamental 
principle of sovereign equality and the correlative exclusive territorial jurisdiction which 
flows from State sovereignty, this same international system has long recognized that such 
national sovereignty can be, at least voluntarily, fettered. Indeed, as recognized by the arbitral 
                                                 
52 Ibid., at 32. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Stec (n 45), at 381. 
55 Ibid, 389. 
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tribunal in the Lac Lanoux case, if territorial sovereignty plays the part of a presumption, it 
must nevertheless bend before all international obligations, whatever their origin.56 Thus, 
irrespective of the conceptual umbrella under which they are developed – be it common 
property, common heritage, common concern or shared resources –sovereignty remains 
increasingly limited by the environmental standards with which States voluntarily comply, or 
perhaps out of necessity in view of the urgency of the threat posed.  
This section will map the range of environmental standards that constrain State 
sovereignty, be it on the basis of the protection of other States’ rights, because of the 
existence of an international interest in resource protection, or even in the absence of any 
such immediate international interest. Incidentally, environmental limitations on sovereignty 
may no longer emanate from exclusively international standards: the absence or weakness of 
international standards may prompt certain States to apply their own more stringent 
environmental regulations extra-territorially. While international law discourages the use of 
extra-territorial unilateral measures,57 it does not specifically prohibit it.58 There have been 
examples of such attempts in the environmental field, such as the protective actions of the 
United States that led to the famous Bering Sea fur seal arbitration.59 Such attempts 
unsurprisingly lead to international disputes which the environmentally minded State has 
often lost. However, according to Sands, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade 
Organization has recently adopted a more sympathetic approach to natural resources 
conservation concerns, even through the adoption of domestic measures applied extra-
territorially.60 Should the international community fail to adopt sufficiently effective 
international standards of resource protection, especially as far as shared or common 
resources are concerned, instances of restrictions of national sovereignty through the extra-
territorial application of domestic environmental legislation may increase. This would have 
                                                 
56 See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (1957) 12 RIAA 281, at 301. 
57 Rio Declaration, Principle 12. 
58 The Case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ Reports Series A No 10, at 19–20. 
59 (United States v Canada) 28 RIAA 263. See also more recently in terms of application of extra-territorial 
measures: United States – Restriction on the Import of Tuna of 1991 (3 September 1991) WT/DS21/R and (16 
June 1994) WT/DS29/R and Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v Canada) (Judgment) [1998] ICJ Reports 432. 
60 See Sands and Peel (n 10), at 193. See also United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, para 133. This point is however debated: eg, Robert Howse, ‘The 
Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment 
Debate’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal International Environmental Law 489 at 510. See also Chapter 3 in this 
volume. 
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the effect of gradually restricting the residual area of freedom from interference of other 
States. 
<b>4.1. Constraints on Sovereignty for Activities Involving Transboundary Damage 
and Beyond 
A core international environmental standard constraining States’ sovereignty over natural 
resources flows directly from the central principle of sovereign equality. The obligation not to 
cause damage to the environment of other States derives from the duty to respect the 
territorial integrity of other States, an expression of their sovereignty. This has its origin in 
the principles sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas and of good neighborliness. Early 
jurisprudential expressions of this rule are found in the Corfu Channel case, where the ICJ 
noted that a State has an ‘obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States’,61 while the Trail Smelter and Lac Lanoux arbitrations 
underlined its specifically environmental dimension.62 In the Trail Smelter case, in particular, 
the Tribunal stated that  
<quotation> 
no State has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory or the properties therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.63 
 </quotation> 
 
Essentially, this principle, also known as the ‘no harm rule’, translates the concern that 
the way in which a State exercises sovereignty over its natural resources – how it will extract, 
transform and exploit them – may have consequences for the environment of other States. It 
thus places restraints on the use of sovereignty over natural resources to avoid such harm. 
The fact that the no harm rule places a limit on the permanent sovereignty principle is clearly 
expressed in the Stockholm and Rio Declarations where these two principles are inextricably 
linked.64 The obligation not to cause damage to the environment of other States or to areas 
                                                 
61 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Judgment) (1949) ICJ Reports 4, at 22. 
62 Trail Smelter (United States v Canada) (16 April 1939 and 11 March 1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1965 and Lake 
Lanoux. 
63 Trail Smelter; Lake Lanoux. Although admittedly the Trail Smelter Arbitration insisted more on the duty of 
reparation once the injury was caused rather than on the duty to prevent such harm to occur. 
64 See Principles 21 and 2 respectively. The drafting of Rio Principle 2 is almost identical to that of Stockholm 
Principle 21, which only omits the reference to “and developmental.” 
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beyond national jurisdiction thus acts as a balance on the right to freely exploit natural 
resources and thereby constrains sovereignty. The customary status of this principle is today 
unquestioned.65  
Technically, the obligation not to cause damage to the environment of other States 
translates into a duty of prevention, itself requiring due diligence on the part of the State 
exercising its sovereignty over natural resources.66 The principle of prevention that the ‘no 
harm rule’ entails, as far as it can be distinguished from the latter, also reflects a customary 
rule.67 The no harm rule poses not an absolute, but a relative obligation on States – an 
obligation to deploy the means necessary to avoid harm without requiring that they achieve 
this result. It is thus known as an obligation of means or conduct: what is expected of the 
State is ‘not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of 
vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public 
and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators 
[…]’.68 
If the constraint on sovereignty derived by the application of the no harm rule flows itself 
from the principle of territorial integrity, arguably, as formulated in the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations and as understood by international courts and tribunals, it has moved beyond 
this application as an extension of the principle of sovereignty. The general obligation of the 
State is indeed not only to refrain from causing harm to the environment of other States, but 
also to areas beyond national jurisdiction.69 Duvic-Paoli and Viñuales note that this  
<quotation> 
changes the perspective of the obligation: the State is not only required to prevent 
transboundary harm in order to respect the sovereignty of other States but is obliged 
                                                 
65 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Reports 241, para 29; 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, para 5; Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway between the 
Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (24 May 2005) (Award) 27 RIAA 35, para 222. 
66 See Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 
(2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 
67 Iron Rhine Railway, para 59; Pulp Mills, para 101. 
68 Pulp Mills, para 197. 
69 See Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21; Rio Declaration, Principle 2; Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, para 29. 
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to protect the environment as such, including those areas such as the global commons 
which have no connection to State sovereignty.70  
</quotation> 
 
This shift in emphasis from sovereignty to the environment per se favors a non-spatial or 
a-territorial approach to environmental protection71 and thus opens the way to an extension of 
the application of the principle to the State’s own environment. In other words, some see in 
the principle of prevention an obligation on States to protect their own environment from 
degradation72 and there are indeed some treaty examples of such domestic constraints on 
sovereignty.73 Duvic-Paoli and Viñuales seem to suggest that it may even have acquired 
customary status.74 Whether it has already crystallized or not, the customary principle 
according to which States are obligated to protect the environment even in the absence of any 
transboundary harm is in the process of development. This makes sense in so far as, in view 
of environmental interdependencies, the international community shares an interest in 
environmental protection by all, within their own jurisdiction. Domestic environmental 
degradation may indeed have global consequences. In these circumstances, constraints on 
sovereignty may flow from an international interest in resource protection. Either way, the 
due diligence (ie non-absolute) nature of the principle of prevention aptly expresses the 
requirements of sustainable development since it requires a balance between permanent 
sovereignty and the duty not to cause harm, hence a balance between economic development 
and environmental protection. In fact, the increasing recognition of an obligation for States to 
strive to achieve sustainable development may well work in favor of the recognition of a 
domestic obligation of due diligence towards the environment since sustainable development 
requires the integration of economic, environmental and social considerations. In this sense, 
an obligation to prevent harm to the domestic environment would indeed be compatible with 
                                                 
70 Leslie-Anne Duvic Paoli and Jorge Viñuales, ‘Principle 2. Prevention’ in Viñuales (n 30) 107, at 117. 
71 Ibid at 117–118. Though, see contra André Nollkaemper, ‘Sovereignty and Environmental Justice in 
International Law’ in Jonas Ebbesson and Phoebe Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 253, at 256–257. 
72 See also Sands and Peel (n 10), at 201. 
73 See, for example, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into 
force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS), Article 192 or the Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted 21 May 1997, entered into force 17 August 2014) UN 
Doc A/51/869, Article 20. 
74 See Duvic Paoli and Viñuales (n 70), at 119. 
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the requirement that the exercise of permanent sovereignty be in the interest of the well-being 
of the people, including their environmental and social well-being, and thus promoting 
sustainable development. 
<b>4.2. Constraints on Sovereignty in Cases of International Interest in Resource 
Protection 
<c>4.2.1. Sustainable Use, Sustainable Development and Commonality of Interest 
Sustainable use is understood to require resource management which yields the greatest 
sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs 
and aspirations of future generations.75 This objective thus implies an intergenerational 
perspective and the adoption of holistic and integrated management strategies based on the 
precautionary and ecosystem approach ‘that account for scientific, economic, social, and 
political uncertainties and that recognize the importance of both consumptive and non-
consumptive uses’.76 The principle of sustainable use is a prolongation of the concepts of 
resource protection, resource preservation and resource conservation,77 as well as of those of 
wise use, rational use or optimum sustainable yield – all of which feature in a range of 
international instruments concerning biological resources, or wild fauna and flora protection 
predating the Rio Conference. By the time of the Rio Conference, however, ‘sustainable use 
had been universally accepted as the basis upon which all living resources should be 
managed’.78 
Sustainable use is closely related to, and an essential measure for, the achievement of the 
objective of sustainable development and, as such, constitutes an acceptable limitation on 
State sovereignty as it in fact allows reconciliation between permanent sovereignty and 
resources protection. Indeed, according to this principle, the use of natural resources, rather 
than being prohibited, must be exercised in a manner that ensures its long-term use and the 
resource’s capacity for regeneration. As such, it works in favor of a continued exploitation of 
the resource and allows for the attainment of the objective of permanent sovereignty: 
                                                 
75 See Robert Munro and Johan Lammers, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal 
Principles and Recommendations Adopted by the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (Graham and Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1986) at 9. 
76 See Rayfuse (n 15), at 373. 
77 On the distinction between these notions, see Rayfuse (n 15), at 370–371. 
78 Sam Johnston, ‘Sustainability, Biodiversity and International Law’ in Catherine Redgwell and Michael 
Bowman (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International, 
1996) 51. 
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ensuring the well-being of the people of the State. By guarding against resource depletion, it 
preserves and furthers the economic, social and potentially cultural well-being which the 
people accrue from the exploitation of the resource, who conversely would suffer from its 
depletion and extinction. By integrating the objectives of permanent sovereignty and resource 
protection, sustainable use thus contributes to achieving a development that is sustainable. 
As a principle of resource management, sustainable use has thus generalized into an 
international environmental standard capable of constraining the State’s sovereignty to 
exploit resources located within its own territory. The legitimacy of such a constraint stems 
from the commonality of interests that States or humankind share in the conservation of such 
resources, even in the absence of a transboundary damage to another State. The principle of 
sustainable use as embedded in the Conservation of Biological Diversity (CBD) is a salient 
example of domestic limitation of sovereignty for resources located within the jurisdiction of 
the State, which finds its legitimacy in the common concern that humankind shares in the 
conservation of biodiversity. Potentially because both the ‘concern’ and those concerned are 
more diffuse than in a case of common or shared property over a resource, the formulation of 
the obligations of sustainable use have a softer character in the CBD regime than in other 
global regulatory regimes, such as UNCLOS. The strength of the legal commitments to 
restrict national sovereignty also increases in a regional or local context, when the common 
interest of States is more immediately felt. 
<c>4.2.2. Sustainable Use and Global Regulatory Regimes 
Under the CBD, the principle of sustainable use, particularly the sustainable use of the 
components of biodiversity, is at the heart of the convention.79 It is defined as  
<quotation> 
the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead 
to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to 
meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations.80  
</quotation> 
 
                                                 
79 CBD, Article 1 Objectives. 
80 CBD, Article 2. 
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This imposes on States obligations to cooperate; adopt strategies for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological resources; identify and monitor important components of 
biodiversity; establish systems of protected areas for in situ conservation; and complementary 
measures of ex situ conservation.81 CBD Article 10 requires the integration of conservation 
and sustainable use into national decision-making and the adoption of measures of resource 
use to avoid adverse impacts on biodiversity. Despite the mandatory language throughout, 
these are admittedly weak commitments. The Convention does not set a clear and 
straightforward general obligation to use the components of biodiversity in a sustainable 
manner, and the provisions are further tempered by qualifications such as ‘as far as possible 
and appropriate’ or ‘in accordance with […] [the State’s] particular conditions and 
capabilities’. Sustainable use thus struggles to constrain State sovereignty in a strict way. The 
balance seems all the more set in favor of State sovereignty since CBD Article 3 reiterates 
Stockholm Principle 21; and CBD Article 15 mandates access to genetic resources to the 
authorization of the State where these are located. Arguably, however, this bolstering of 
national sovereignty may ultimately work in favor of resource protection. By laying out the 
conditions under which access to the exploitation of genetic resources is going to be granted 
(to other States), the State of origin may well set up a system ensuring their conservation and 
sustainable use, even if in its purely domestic interest.82 In that sense, the subjection of 
resource access to the principle of national sovereignty empowers the State of origin to 
design sustainable resource management regimes. 
Beyond the universal scope of the Convention, the softness of States’ commitments to use 
components of biodiversity sustainably may well be a consequence of the diffuse nature of 
the interest that mankind shares in biodiversity and its components. The economic value of 
biological resources is not always apparent, and, consequently, the immediacy of the benefits 
that States can derive from them or the necessity of their conservation may be less intensely 
felt. It remains the case, however, that despite the relative character of the CBD provisions 
relating to sustainable use, they do not leave national sovereignty completely intact. States 
are still subject to cooperation obligations and obligations to adopt a range of measures 
                                                 
81 CBD, Articles 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, respectively. 
82 A system of access and benefit sharing has been further elaborated by the 2010 Nagoya Protocol: see Chapter 
11 in this volume. On the link with sustainable use, see Elisa Morgera et al., Unravelling the Nagoya Protocol: 
A Commentary on the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Brill/Nijhoff Publishers, 2014) at 48 ff. 
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ultimately encouraging sustainable use. Exploitation of biological resources has thus been 
subtracted from their exclusive jurisdiction, even though such elements might be located 
within the boundaries of their territory. The wide and generalized acceptance of such 
constraints has also been acceptable specifically because it has developed under the umbrella 
of sustainable use. Indeed, contrary to preservationist or intrinsic value philosophies, the 
principle of sustainable use is essentially value-oriented and anthropocentric in nature. This 
makes it an acceptable compromise for States to limit their sovereignty as they can see in it, 
even if sometimes in a diffuse manner, their own interest. 
In contrast to the CBD, under the law of the sea it is easier to deduce more constraining 
sustainable-use obligations. UNCLOS Articles 192 and 193, for example, apply to the marine 
environment generally, irrespective of questions of jurisdictional delimitations. This means 
that the duty of States to protect and preserve the marine environment, which qualifies their 
sovereign right to exploit their natural resources, binds them even within the boundaries of 
their territorial sea. Because UNCLOS Article 193 balances the obligation to preserve the 
marine environment with permanent sovereignty, it can be deduced that the obligation on 
States is really one of sustainable use rather than a general obligation to protect the 
environment. Indeed, States may exploit their resources, but only while respecting 
environmental limitations – that is, in a sustainable manner. This can be further deduced from 
UNCLOS obligations to prevent over-exploitation in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),83 
as well as to cooperate to ensure the conservation and optimum utilization of migratory fish 
stocks in the EEZ84 or of the resources of the high seas.85 In fact, the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea in 2015 confirmed that UNCLOS imposed an obligation on States to 
ensure sustainable management of shared stocks while they occur in their EEZ.86  
<c>4.2.3. Sustainable Use and Regional or Local Regulatory Regimes 
Sustainable use obligations are also widespread in regional or local natural resources 
regulatory regimes where the common or shared interest is more vividly felt by States, with 
                                                 
83 UNCLOS, Article 61.2. 
84 See UNCLOS, Articles 63 and 64. See also Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence Between Canada and 
France (17 July 1986) 19 RIAA 225, para 50. 
85 See UNCLOS, Articles 116 and 119. See also, more generally, Chapter 9 in this volume. 
86 See Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (Advisory 
Opinion) (2 April 2015) ITLOS Reports 2014, paras 191–192 and 207. 
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post-UNCED agreements being increasingly premised upon the objective of sustainable use 
as a basis for constraining State sovereignty domestically. At the regional level, for example, 
the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, in its 2003 
revised version, requires States to adopt and implement all measures necessary to achieve the 
objective of fostering the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.87 
Interestingly, the revision was also intended to expand elements related to sustainable 
development88 and the language of sustainable use now replaces that of wise use. Among 
regional seas conventions, the 2008 Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management of the 
Mediterranean provides that ‘Parties shall endeavor to ensure the sustainable use and 
management of coastal zones in order to preserve the coastal natural habitats, landscapes, 
natural resources and ecosystems’.89 In mountain areas, the Carpathian Convention obliges 
States to ‘pursue policies aiming at conservation, sustainable use and restoration of biological 
and landscape diversity’ and to ‘take appropriate measures to ensure a high level of 
protection and sustainable use of natural and semi-natural habitats’.90 As far as lakes are 
concerned, the objective of the 2003 Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake 
Tanganyika is to ‘ensure the protection and conservation of the biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of the natural resources of Lake Tanganyika and its Basin […]’.91 
Significantly, these regimes are unbothered by the lack of primarily transboundary issues. 
States are subject to these obligations domestically by virtue of the interest they share in the 
resources at stake.  
Sustainable use is also prominent in river systems agreements.92 The 1994 Danube River 
Protection Convention expects the parties to ‘strive at achieving the goals of a sustainable 
and equitable water management, including the conservation, improvement and the rational 
                                                 
87 See African Convention, Articles 2 and 4. 
88 See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 22), at 656. 
89 Article 8. See also the Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable Development of the 
Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific (concluded 18 February 2002, not yet in force), 
Article 5; and the 2003 Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea 
(adopted 4 November 2003, entered into force 12 August 2006) 44 ILM 1, Article 2. 
90 Framework Convention on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Carpathians (adopted 22 May 
2003), Article 4. 
91 Article 2. See also Protocol for Sustainable Development of the Lake Victoria Basin (adopted 29 November 
2003), Article 7. 
92 See Chapter 15 in this volume. 
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use of surface waters and ground water in the catchment area as far as possible’,93 whereas 
the 2002 Incomati and Maputo River Tripartite Agreement aims to ‘promote co-operation 
among the Parties to ensure the protection and sustainable utilization of the water resources 
of the Incomati and Maputo watercourses’.94 It identifies for this purpose sustainable 
utilization as a key general principle to apply.95 Concerns for the protection of ecosystems 
have thus become more salient in recent river treaty systems and act as a balance to the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.96 In fact, in 2004, the commentary to the ILA 
Berlin Rules on Water Resources Law noted that sustainability is a ‘separate and compelling 
obligation that […] conditions the rule of equitable and reasonable use without displacing 
it’.97 It may actually be that the principle of sustainable use, as an expression of sustainable 
development, is slowly replacing that of equitable and reasonable utilization.98 
<c>4.2.4. Sustainable Use and Customary International Law: Concluding Remarks 
According to the ILA, 
<quotation> 
as a matter of common concern, the sustainable use of all natural resources represents 
an emerging rule of general customary international law, with particular normative 
precision identifiable with respect to shared and common natural resources.99  
</quotation> 
 
A recent arbitral decision has also found that ‘since the time of Trail Smelter, a series of 
international conventions, and judicial and arbitral decisions have addressed the need to 
                                                 
93 Article 2. 
94 Article 2. 
95 See Article 3. See also Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin (adopted 3 December 2002, entered 
into force 3 December 2002) Article 11 and Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of 
the Mekong River Basin (adopted 5 April 1995, entered into force 5 April 1995) 34 ILM 864, Articles 1–3. 
96 Eg Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Relationship between the Law of International Watercourses and Sustainable 
Development’ in Bodansky, Brunée and Hey (n 15), 615. 
97 ILA Berlin Rules (2004), at 16. 
98 See Pulp Mills, para 177. 
99 2012 Sofia Guiding Statements on the Judicial Elaboration of the 2002 New Delhi Declaration of Principles 
of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development (2012), para 3. 
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manage natural resources in a sustainable manner’.100 These assertions find support in the 
provisions relating to sustainable use incorporated in the regimes discussed above. Birnie, 
Boyle and Redgwell also admit that “the evidence of treaty commitments, coupled with 
indications of supporting State practice, might be sufficient to crystallize conservation and 
sustainable use of natural resources into an independent normative standard of international 
law.’101 They warn, however, ‘It is clear that States retain substantial discretion in giving 
effect to the alleged principle, unless specific international action has been agreed’.102 As 
reflected in the regimes reviewed above, with some rare exceptions, where the principle of 
sustainable use constrains State sovereignty, it does so as an objective to be achieved, leaving 
the State some room for maneuver as to how much effort to put into it. This flexibility, 
together with the clear anthropocentric nature of the principle, make it for States a more 
acceptable constraint on sovereignty than a general obligation to protect their own 
environment. It constitutes in this sense a useful tool to limit national sovereignty, even in the 
absence of any transboundary damage.  
Its appeal, however, has its own boundaries. Firstly, the management of tropical forests, 
in which humanity’s interest is undisputed, is a dire example of the failure of the principle of 
sustainable use to trump national sovereignty: the ‘polarization and sensitivity over 
sovereignty issues still inhibits the conclusion of a comprehensive global convention despite 
the accelerating destruction of tropical forests’.103 Secondly, where the principle of 
sustainable use of natural resources constrains the State’s sovereignty over resources located 
within its own territory, this is because the State shares an interest with others in this 
resource, either as a shared resource or because its conservation constitutes a common 
concern of mankind. Either way, there is an international or common interest in resource 
conservation.  
<b>4.3. Constraints on Sovereignty in the Absence of an Immediate International 
Interest in Resource Protection 
Unless there is a clear recognition that protection of the global environment is a common 
concern of humankind, it seems difficult to discern the existence of a general obligation on 
                                                 
100 Indus Waters Kishenganga arbitration (Pakistan v India) (Partial Award) (18 February 2013), para 449 
<http://www.pca-cpa.org> accessed 5 September 2015. 
101 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 22), at 200. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid, at 695. 
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States to protect their own environment or to exploit their natural resources in a domestic 
context in a sustainable manner. Yet, there are some international rights or resource 
protection models that may help shape and conceptualize the contours of such an obligation. 
The 1999 Protocol on Water and Health to the Helsinki Convention applies to all waters 
within the territory of a party, including internal and domestic waters.104 It thus designs 
international rules in respect of resources for which States do not have a common interest: 
they are not shared, nor does their protection constitute a common concern of humankind. 
Yet, the parties ‘shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce water-
related disease within a framework of integrated water-management systems aimed at 
sustainable use of water resources, ambient water quality which does not endanger human 
health, and protection of water ecosystems’.105 Hey rightly points out that the Protocol 
‘distances itself from the classical inter-State paradigm’106 in that its central objective ‘is the 
interest of individuals and groups in society in drinking water of sufficient quality and 
quantity and water for sanitation’.107 Critically, it places the responsibility for protecting that 
interest on individual State parties within their own territory.108 Resource protection must 
thus be ensured not because of State parties’ shared interest in it, but in the interest of the 
well-being of the people of the State. The focus in this context is on the protection of 
individual rights. It highlights how human rights law, and its quintessentially anthropocentric 
character, may well provide an alternative medium for domestic constraints on States’ rights 
to use natural resources domestically when, in the absence of shared international interest, 
purely ecocentric considerations are unlikely justifications for sovereignty limitation.109 
States are not selfless, and if they agree to respect human rights it is because ultimately it 
benefits someone, be it individuals rather than sovereign entities. Human beings are, after all, 
at the center of concern of human-made law. From this point of view, human rights may well 
constitute an alternative model for constraining State sovereignty and imposing a general 
duty on States to conserve and use natural resources sustainably, even absent any purely 
                                                 
104 Article 3. 
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international element, except for maybe the shared interest in the well-being of humans 
(humankind?). The right to safe and sufficient drinking water is but one example which 
would require conservation and sustainable use of such resource that is essential to human 
beings. The right to food would provide another, this time impacting on a much broader array 
of resources.110 
 
<A>5. CONCLUSION 
The growing realization of global interdependencies coupled with the rise of international 
environmental standards and new legal categories has put the concept of national sovereignty 
over natural resources under attack. Limitations on national sovereignty thus flow from 
innovative legal categories such as common heritage, humanity, intergenerational equity or 
common concern of mankind. Other constraints are derived from the generalization of 
international rules such as the no harm and prevention principles, as well as the principle of 
sustainable use. Though unsurprisingly, the more diffuse the commonality of interests or the 
international element, the weaker the resulting limitation on State powers. Human rights law 
may offer an alternative model for constraining State sovereignty in relation to the 
conservation of natural resources even in a purely domestic context. Yet this approach 
remains premised on anthropocentric considerations. Ultimately, sovereignty limitations 
grounded in intrinsically ecocentric concerns are as yet unlikely to break ground.  
To the contrary, the primarily utilitarian vision of environmental and natural resources 
protection finds further confirmation in the generalization of the principle of sustainable 
development and the reorganization of most international environmental law around this 
paradigmatic ‘conceptual matrix’.111 If the environment is to be protected, it is for the benefit 
of the economic and social well-being of individuals, peoples and States. It is under the 
sustainable development umbrella that sovereignty and resource conservation can be 
reconciled: there they have found their common and mutual interest. The parameters of such 
reconciliation, however, have yet to be specified in a number of areas. An example of an 
issue that would deserve further elucidation is that of the ambiguous relationship between the 
principle of sustainable development and the principle of equitable use in the field of shared 
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water resources. Is the trend in international law to seek for an accommodation of these two 
principles, or is the principle of equitable use in fact being subsumed into that of sustainable 
development, as the ICJ seems to suggest in the Pulp Mills case?112 Equally, the precise legal 
implications of the concept of common concern of humankind remains in need of 
clarification, in particular as regards its relationship with state responsibility. Could the 
common concern regime relating to atmospheric resources work towards facilitating the 
engagement of state responsibility for human-induced climate change? Hopefully, the work 
of the ILC on the topic of the protection of the atmosphere will be able to provide useful 
guidance in this respect, as well as on the principle of sustainable development itself.113 
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